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JUDGING IN EUROPE: DO LEGAL
TRADITIONS MATTER?
Angela Huyue Zhang, Jingchen Liu & Nuno Garoupa
ABSTRACT
EU competition appeals typically involve applications by private businesses to
annul decisions made by the European Commission. Moreover, these appeals
are first assigned at random to a chamber, with a judge then designated as the
rapporteur who will be most closely involved with the case. Using hand-
collected original data on the background characteristics of EU judges and on
competition judgments by the General Court between 1989 and 2015, we test
the extent to which the legal origins of judges bear a statistically significant
effect on case outcomes and that the rapporteur plays a crucial role in the
decision-making process. In particular, if a rapporteur comes from a country
whose administrative law has a strong French influence, the decision is more
likely to favor the Commission than if he is from any other EU country. These
results are robust to alternative political ideology variables, including left–right
politics and a preference for European integration.
I. INTRODUCTION
Competition law is a global enterprise. Yet despite the powerful forces of global-
ization and the pressures for convergence and harmonization, pronounced
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differences remain between the United States and the EU, the world’s two most
advanced antitrust regimes. Experts have attributed this divergence primarily to
asymmetrical judicial intervention, particularly the jurisprudence of the highest
court in each jurisdiction (Fox, 2014). Indeed, decisions from the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) often appear formalistic and legalistic, in
sharp contrast to their US counterparts (Fox, 2014). In highly salient competi-
tion cases such asMicrosoft, the General Court decided to defer to the European
Commission (Commission) when it came to complex economic or technical
analysis, whereas in Intel, the court relied on some antiquated precedents and
completely dispensed with economic analysis. Similarly, in cartel cases, the
court tends to defer to the Commission when fine-based sanctions are entailed,
despite the fact that it enjoys unlimited jurisdiction in evaluating the fines
(Forrester, 2012).
But this phenomenon is hardly unique to competition law. As the substance
of EU law becomes more technical and sophisticated in other areas such as
agriculture, intellectual property, and state-aid, the CJEU is increasingly seen
exercising “light judicial review” over administrative actions (De la Serre and
Anne-Lise, 2008; Donnely, 2010). But there are notable exceptions. In some
early competition cases, as well as a number of merger cases in early 2000s,
the Luxembourg court engaged in extensive and in-depth economic reasoning,
striking down a series of the Commission’s decisions (Forrester, 2011). The
impact of these rulings was far-reaching, triggering a major internal restructur-
ing within the Commission. The variance of the court’s standard of review,
therefore, caused much confusion among practitioners and academics, who
accused the court of producing inconsistent, illogical, and incomprehensible
case law (Forrester, 2011; Colomo, 2013).
What explains the difference in judicial intervention in the United States and
the EU? More specifically, how do we explain the variance that practitioners
have observed in the court’s approach to reviewing the Commission’s decisions?
Further, what has contributed to the growing trend of “light” judicial review?
Existing literature on EU competition law has tried to rationalize this by refer-
ring to its legislative history and philosophical underpinnings, where German
ordoliberalism assumes a fundamental role (Gerber, 1998). Although ordoliber-
alism may have been an important force in shaping EU competition law, it fails
to resolve the puzzle of why there has been growing convergence between US
antitrust law and EU competition law at the agency but not the judiciary level.
Nor does it explain the variance in the judicial standard among different cases
and the growing trend of light judicial review.
We believe that the main problem with the current literature is that it
tends to view the CJEU as a black box and ignores, or even denies, one cru-
cial element in judicial law making—human behavior. Indeed, if we view
judicial outcome as a good, its output is mainly determined by two factors.
One is the input of human capital, and the other is the process of producing
the good, in this case, the process of how decisions are made. To fully understand
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judicial output, it is, therefore, essential to make an in-depth inquiry into both
the decision-makers and the decision-making process, as well as the underlying
institutional framework within which they operate.
To begin, the jurisprudence of EU competition law has been produced by an
international tribunal consisting of judges from countries with varying legal tradi-
tions within Europe (a few common law and several civil law jurisdictions). Legal
economists have long argued that a country’s legal heritage shapes its approach
to property rights as well as the level of control that state sovereignty exercises
over judges (Mahoney, 2001). Although there are disagreements concerning the
particular inclinations of different legal cultures (Garoupa et al., 2017; Patrick,
2010), it is widely accepted that a judge’ training within particular legal traditions
instill in him1 a particular understanding of the role of the courts in relation to
the government. At the same time, the loosely worded provisions of the EU
Treaty provide judges with ample discretion in determining proper levels of scru-
tiny in administrative decisions (Sweet, 2004). This is especially true with regard
to competition cases, which often involve complex factual issues but are not sub-
ject to clear statutory guidance as to the proper standard of judicial review. As a
consequence, the diversity in judges’ legal training and culture could become a
source of conflict among judges in handling competition appeals.
Meanwhile, EU judicial law-making is a cooperative enterprise where judges
work together in a committee. Each case is first allocated to a chamber on a ran-
dom basis, with the president of the chamber then designating a judge to act as
rapporteur. The rapporteur assumes the most responsibility in drafting the judg-
ment and is also the first to provide observations and recommendations to the
case. Although other judges in the chamber (officially entitled assessors) also con-
tribute to the case with comments and feedback, in practice the rapporteur is the
most involved and active judge in that particular case. Therefore, even though con-
ceptually each judge in the chamber is entitled to the same voting power, in reality
their influence may vary depending on their particular roles in any given case. This
group dynamic may, therefore, influence judicial voting in competition appeals.
The unique role of the rapporteur has been recognized in empirical studies
on other national courts in Europe (Garoupa et al., 2012; Dalla Pellegrina and
Garoupa, 2013). Within a panel, the rapporteur bears the most costs in compil-
ing the relevant information, engaging in legal analysis, and preparing an initial
draft of the judgment. Opposing the proposal of the rapporteur inevitably gener-
ates additional costs for the panel, adding new stages to the process of delivering
a decision, and exposing the panel members to additional pressures in delay and
backlog. It is, therefore, natural that judges tend to be deferential to the rappor-
teur. Moreover, such tendency is consistent with an inclination for dissent
avoidance, a preference for a collegial working environment, and the desire of
an effective allocation of judicial resources in a congested court.
1 For the sake of brevity, we refer to an EU judge as “he” throughout this Article. Note, how-
ever, some of judges who have served at the CJEU are females.
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We test the effects of legal origins and group dynamic using two hand-
collected original databases: one consists of the background characteristics of all
the judges who served at the General Court from the start of 1989 to September
1, 2015; the other of all competition judgments decided by the General Court
during the same period. Our empirical results show that the legal tradition in
which the rapporteur was bred bears a statistically significant effect on the case
outcome. Specifically, if the rapporteur came from a country where its adminis-
trative law has a strong French influence, the outcome is more likely to favor the
Commission than if the rapporteur is from any other EU country. At the same
time, holding constant the legal origin of the rapporteur, the ratio of the legal
origins of the judges within the chamber does not have a statistically significant
effect. These results are consistent with our hypotheses that legal traditions
influence judicial attitudes and that the panel dynamics among judges would
amplify or dampen such influence.
Our empirical analysis controls for other possible explanations, namely polit-
ical ideology such as left–right politics and preference for European integration.
Previous empirical studies on the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
find that political ideology matters for judicial preference, whereas legal tradition
does not seem to play a role (Voeten, 2007, 2008). We show that the influence
of legal traditions is relevant despite political orientation. This is a significant
result, as there has been a long ongoing debate about these two dimensions of
legal culture and ideology, and the extent to which the law merely reflects polit-
ical preference. Specifically, Roe (2003) argued that the French inclination for
fewer pro-market solutions in law simply derives from a taste for social democ-
racy that is absent in the Anglo-American world. Moreover, it is widely perceived
that that common law judges are more Eurosceptic than French or German
judges. We suggest that EU judicial decision-making can be explained by legal
tradition even when taking into account these possible ideological biases.
Our findings are, however, limited to the competition judgments decided by
the General Court. One explanation for the divergence between our results and
the previous literature on the ECHR may be to do with the difference in the type
of cases under judicial review. Competition law is a technical and specialized
area of law. The vast majority of competition cases are routine and highly fact-
intensive. It is for this reason that the CJEU established the Court of First
Instance (predecessor of the General Court) to handle competition cases,
together with other standard cases involving staff and intellectual property
issues. Interview findings by one of us suggest that judges and their référendaires
(the official title for law clerks) in Luxembourg generally do not view competi-
tion cases as political cases (Zhang, 2016).
Thus far, empirical work on the CJEU has primarily focused on how the pre-
ferences of EU member states have influenced the way that judges resolve cases
(Carrubba et al., 2008, 2012). Scholars have proposed different explanations for
the court’s decisions in siding with the Commission. Sweet and Brunell (2012)
suggest that the court has particular deference for the Commission because the
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latter is its presumed partner in constructing the supranational judicial authority,
whereas Carrubba et al. (2008) argue that the court was constrained by the
threats of noncompliance and legislative overrides by the powerful member state
governments.
In a departure from previous empirical literature, this article is the first to test
the statistical relationship between the legal origins of the EU judges and judicial
outcome at the General Court. The article is also the first to test the dynamics of
group decision-making on case outcomes inside the court. Our empirical results
not only have important implications in the study of EU competition law, but
also in other areas of EU law where the court has the power and discretion to
make law. This article also contributes to the empirical studies on international
courts, where judges with diverse legal backgrounds collectively decide on cases.
Existing literature on judicial group decision-making is primarily based on the
US setting where judges’ votes are observable. As many courts in civil law coun-
tries employ similar decision-making processes as the court by issuing a single
judgment without dissent, this article further contributes to the study of multi-
member judicial settings where judges’ voting preferences are not observable.
Our research is also timely and has important implications for understanding
of the impact of Brexit on the CJEU. At the Annual Antitrust Spring Meeting
held in Washington, D.C. in March 2017, Marc van der Woude, the vice presi-
dent of the General Court, said that the running of his court would not be
affected by Brexit, but it might nonetheless suffer when it loses British members
with a common law tradition (Mlex, 2017). As he was quoted below: “There is
no organizational impact, but there will be a cultural impact. And I fear that
impact is negative.” (Mlex, 2017). Judge van der Woude stressed that common
law judges brought with them a different approach to the “intensity” of review-
ing cases in Luxembourg and that the UK had a “real tradition of the rule of
law, so that input for this melting pot of our court will disappear.” (Mlex, 2017).
The findings in this article echoed with the observation by the judge.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 delves into the various legal tra-
ditions of Europe and examines the potential conflict among EU judges in con-
ducting judicial review of competition appeals. Section 3 investigates the court’s
decision-making process and analyzes how the panel dynamics among judges
could affect their voting on a case. Using hand-collected data on the background
characteristics of EU judges and on the competition judgments, Section 4 then
conducts an empirical test of the effects of legal origins and panel dynamics.
Section 5 concludes and provides implications for this study.
II. LEGAL ORIGINS
Judges do not make decisions in a vacuum. Their preconceptions, which are
nourished by education, work experience, and political ideology, among other
possible determinants, can have a profound impact on how judges evaluate the
facts and how they reach a decision (Nicola, 2017). Even if a judge may not be
5Judging in Europe: Do Legal Traditions Matter?
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consciously aware of it, no judge can ignore his prior conceptions in making a
decision (Posner, 2008). Surely, EU statutes and the precedents of the CJEU
play a critical role in the decision-making of judges, and it would be an over-
statement to claim that they are disregarded in reaching their desired outcome.
But when judges are confronted with complex facts and circumstances, and can
no longer rationalize through pure legal reasoning, their intuition is likely to
come into play (Stone Sweet, 2004; Nicola, 2017).
As products of specific national legal systems, EU judges have been bred in
legal traditions spanning the historical divide between the common law and civil
law systems. Within the civil law systems, the EU is home to three common legal
families: French, German, and Nordic (Zweigert and Kotz, 2011). The most
common legal tradition in Europe is the French model, which, according to an
influential strand of literature by legal economists, historically placed emphasis
on the use of state power to alter property rights in ensuring judges cannot inter-
fere (La Porta et al. 1998). The French tradition assumes a larger role for the
state, deferring more powers to the administrative branch, which relegates the
judiciary to a bureaucratic and subordinate role (Mahoney, 2001). In contrast,
the common law tradition affords the judges broad discretion in interpretation
and endorses judicial review as essential part of the protection of private property
rights and liberty (Mahoney, 2001).2
This results in different institutional arrangements when it comes to review-
ing executive action.3 Although the common law does not distinguish between
public and private law, instead offering the same protection to all legal actors,
the French law tradition espouses a sharp distinction between them and offers
different protections for the state and private parties (Bell, 2001). Procedurally,
administrative cases are handled by specialized administrative courts and judges
are drawn from a distinct corps of the administration (Brown and Bell, 1998).
Substantively, French administrative law has been observed to intrude less in
the decisions made by the executive, which is entrusted with the freedom to pur-
sue the collective public interest (Schwarze, 2006).
The economic implications of these institutional arrangements, as well as the
recent trend in legal reform of promoting convergence across Europe, have been
subject to much controversy (Garoupa et al., 2017). Indeed, French administra-
tive law was never codified and is instead mostly developed by the Conseil
d’État, the highest level of the administrative court in France (Bell, 2001).
2 It is worth noting that judicial deference to expert doctrines is deemed constitutionally accept-
able in common law countries. The Wednesbury principle made administrative action subject
to a reasonable test in English law, and according to the Chevron doctrine in the US, federal
courts defer to reasonable interpretations of statutes by agencies. However, deference in com-
mon law countries is largely the outcome of strategic delegation, as one of us explained in a
previous article (Garoupa and Mathews, 2014).
3 The court–agency relationship in different legal families closely follows a rational choice
between discretion and deference that reflects the main lines of reasoning common to the
standard discussion in private law, as one of us explained in a previous article (Garoupa and
Mathews, 2014).
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However, it is important to recognize that French administrative law was
inspired by the overriding philosophy of the French revolution, which accords
that the courts cannot interfere with the workings of the administrative agencies
(Schwartz, 1954). As French administrative law is founded upon recognizing
the autonomy and independence of the executive, administrative courts have
never been conceptualized to restrain the power of the government, unlike their
English counterparts (Schwartz, 1954). As Bell stated: “The English approach is
that review is exercised by the informed outsider, be it the judge or an ombuds-
man. The French approach is that review is conducted by an institutionally
detached insider. Both are independent, but their backgrounds and starting
points may differ.” (Bell, 2001).
Meanwhile, France has been considered to be the most advanced in the
development of administrative law and its model has been followed by most
other Continental European countries (Bell, 2001). Schwarze (2006) noted
that French administrative law not only has a deep influence on countries
with French legal origin, but also on the German law tradition. For instance,
Otto Mayer, an influential German administrative law scholar and a signifi-
cant contributor to the development of German administrative law, was a
professor who specialized in French administrative law (Schwarze, 2006).
The French model also had profound influence on Eastern European coun-
tries that started to join the CJEU from 2004. After the fall of the Berlin
Wall, these Eastern Europe countries reverted to their pre-Soviet legal sys-
tems, which were French or German law (Glendon et al., 2014).
By contrast, the French model has a relatively weak influence on Nordic coun-
tries. This may be due to the historical origin of the Nordic legal tradition. First,
unlike the French or German law traditions, Roman law has little influence on
Nordic countries (Zweigert and Kotz, 2011). Second, the Nordic countries have
never systematically codified their civil laws, thus legal formalities play a less
important role in Nordic countries than those in other Continental European
countries, and its laws are more judge-oriented (Bernitz, 2007). Third, legal his-
torians assert that Nordic legal theorists share similar beliefs with common law
scholars regarding the realism in law, which manifests in the judicial opinions of
Nordic judges being seen as more argumentative and pragmatic than their
Continental European peers (Bell, 2006). Indeed, unlike most other Continental
European countries, there is no clear distinction between public and private law
in Nordic countries. In fact, administrative courts do not exist in Denmark and
Norway (Gellhorn, 1967; Schwarze, 2006). Edwardsson (2009) observes that
administrative courts in Sweden traditionally have the power to conduct intense
reviews of agency decisions. He notes that Swedish administrative courts have the
same power as the administrative authority, in contrast to most other continental
European countries. Nordic countries were also the first to create the ombuds-
man system to check administrative power (Gellhorn, 1967). Departing from the
French practice of conducting checks on the administration through an insider
system, ombudsmen are chosen and report only to Parliament, and are thus com-
pletely immunized from political pressures of the government (Gellhorn, 1967).
7Judging in Europe: Do Legal Traditions Matter?
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Following La Porta et al. (2008), we classify the existing EU countries
into the French, German, Nordic, ex-socialist, and common law traditions.
See Table 1, which also indicates the year of accession of each member state.
However, this classification is not immune to controversy and it has been at
the heart of significant criticism in recent years (Garoupa and Pargendler,
2014). With the goal of testing for robustness, we also consider alternative
taxonomies. For instance, some countries with a French legal origin have
received German influence and the Supreme Courts of these countries often
do not use citations in French. Gelter and Siems (2013) suggest that courts
in these countries tend to cluster by language and thus we consider these
French legal traditions that speak French and those that do not separately.
Similarly, German law has influenced some of the ex-socialist countries, as
they were previously a part of the former Austria–Hungarian Empire, so we
also consider them separately in our analysis. As explained further in Section
IV below, our empirical results are independent of any particular classifica-
tion, and subdivisions of French, German, and Socialist legal origins do not
matter significantly to our conclusions.
Importantly, the composition of legal traditions at the CJEU is not static,
rather, it has been gradually evolving with the continued expansion of the
EU. Because our study focuses on the General Court, we observe its evolve-
ment from its inception in 1989. As illustrated in Figure 1 below, from 1989
to 1994, out of the twelve EU member states, eight had a French legal origin;
only one state had a German legal origin (Germany itself), two had common
law origins (UK4 and Ireland), and one had a Nordic law origin (Denmark).
Table 1. Classification of EU Member States by Legal Origin
Common
Law
Nordic French German Ex-socialist
Pure
French
German
French
German Ex-
socialist
Other Ex-
socialist
UK
(1973)
Denmark
(1973)
France
(1958)
Netherlands
(1958)
Germany
(1958)
Czech (2004) Poland
(2004)
Ireland
(1973)
Finland
(1995)
Belgium
(1958)
Italy (1958) Austria
(1995)
Slovakia
(2004)
Estonia
(2004)
Cyprus
(2004)
Sweden
(1995)
Luxembourg
(1958)
Greece
(1981)
Hungary
(2004)
Latvia
(2004)
Malta
(2004)
Portugal
(1986)
Slovenia
(2004)
Lithuania
(2004)
Spain
(1986)
Croatia
(2013)
Bulgaria
(2007)
Romania
(2007)
4 There could be doubts about whether Scotland should be categorized as the rest of the United
Kingdom as a common law jurisdiction. Indeed, Scottish law has a mixture of civil law and
8 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
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The balance of legal cultures changes slightly in 1995, with the addition of a
second German legal origin country (Austria) and two Nordic countries
(Finland and Sweden). A major shift took place in 2004 with the expansion
of the EU leading to the addition of eight former socialist states plus two add-
itional common law states (Cyprus and Malta). In 2007, two additional for-
mer socialist states (Bulgaria and Romania) joined the EU. Another former
socialist state (Croatia) joined in 2013.
III. INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS
Before the 2015 reform, the CJEU comprised three tribunals: The Court of
Justice, the General Court, and the Civil Service Tribunal which specializes
in staff cases (Alemmano and Pech, 2017). The Court of Justice is the high-
est level of the CJEU, but also acts as the court of first instance for certain
matters. The General Court is the lower court. It hears actions against EU
institutions, though certain matters are reserved for the Court of Justice. The
General Court mainly deals with fact-intensive cases involving competition,
state-aid, trade, agriculture, or trademarks. Cases heard at the first instance
8 8 8 8 8
1 2 2 2 2
8 10
11
2 2
4
4 4
1
3
3
3 3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1989–1994 1995–2003 2004–2006 2007–2012 2013–2015
French German Ex-Socialist Common Nordic
Figure 1. The Composition of Legal Traditions at the General Court (1989–2015).
common law elements. But the UK Supreme Court hears civil appeals from Scotland and it is
essential for Scottish lawyers to be familiar with the common law. Among the three British
judges who were appointed to the General Court during 1989–2015, only one judge (David
Edward) came from Scotland. Judge Edward served at the General Court from 1989 to 1992.
He received his undergraduate degree in Oxford before returning to Scotland for further stud-
ies and practice. During his practice in Scotland, he frequently appeared in front of the House
of Lords (the then UK Supreme Court) (Smith, 2005).
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by the General Court may be subject to appeal to the Court of Justice on
points of law only. As the EU’s main executive arm, the Commission is the
most frequent party to appear before the Court. Although member states
have a primary responsibility to apply EU law, the Commission monitors its
application and may bring infringement action against a member state for
noncompliance. With regard to competition, the Commission acts as both
the investigator and prosecutor and can bring actions directly against indivi-
duals and companies.
For purpose of this study, the focus of the inquiry is on the General Court,
which is the court of first instance for appeals against the decisions of the
Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission (DG
Comp). Although the General Court was initially created to deal with competi-
tion cases, the portion of such cases was diluted over the years as the court’s jur-
isdictional competence expanded. Figure 2 shows that the percentage of
competition cases (excluding state-aid) was relatively stable (at approximately
11%) during the period from 1989 to 2003, but declined to 7% in subsequent
years. Meanwhile, the share of intellectual property cases has increased dramat-
ically and accounted for almost 30% during the same period.
EU judges work together in a committee. From the General Court’s inception
in 1989 to the early 1990s, competition cases were most commonly heard by a
chamber consisting of five judges. As the court’s caseload increased and the
European Union expanded, the court was divided into smaller chambers. Since
the late 1990s, the vast majority of competition cases are heard by chambers con-
sisting of three judges. More complex cases were heard by extended chambers
consisting of five judges, and certain types of important cases are reviewed by the
grand chamber consisting of 13 judges presided over by the President of the court.
Before the 2015 reforms, at the General Court, all incoming cases are allo-
cated to chambers in turn following three separate rotas: (1) competition and
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1989–1994 1995–2003 2004–2015
Others
Provision Governing The
Institution
Staff
State Aid
Intellectual Property
Competition
Agriculture and Fisheries
Figure 2. Major Categories of Cases Handled by the General Court.
Source: CJEU case database
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state-aid cases, (2) intellectual property cases, and (3) all other cases.5
According to the court’s rules of procedure, the President of the General Court
may derogate from the rota to ensure an even spread of the workload.6 After a
case is allocated to a chamber, the chamber president will propose that the
President assign the case to a judge as rapporteur. Although the President has
the authority to decide on the proposal, in practice, the discretion lies with the
chamber president, as the latter has more information regarding the workload
and expertise of the other judges within the chamber. Accordingly, case alloca-
tion to chambers largely follows an automatic process, with the exception of the
interference from the President on the basis of workload. On the other hand, the
designation of the rapporteur is not a purely random process. A chamber presi-
dent may consider expertise, workload, and other policy factors that are very
individualized when choosing the rapporteur.
The rapporteur assumes the responsibility in drafting the report of the hear-
ing, which is essentially a summary of the parties’ arguments, and a preliminary
report, which is purely an internal document for purposes of deliberation. The
preliminary report summarizes the legal and factual background of the case and
concludes with the personal observations and recommendations of the rappor-
teur. This report is then circulated to the other judges on the panel for comments
and feedback. After deliberation, the rapporteur incorporates any comments
from the other judges with the aim of ensuring that a consensus is reached
among the panel members. Barring serious disagreement, there is no need for
voting among judges. The General Court only issues a single judgment and the
actual votes of the judges are not observable. In theory, each judge sitting in the
panel is entitled to the same voting power. However, in practice, the influence of
individual judges may vary depending on their particular roles in a case.
Due to the designated functions prescribed by the General Court’s rules and
procedures, the rapporteur is often the most involved judge in the case. It is very
common for the rapporteur to delegate writing initial drafts of hearings and pre-
liminary reports to one of their référendaires. The référendaire also bears the
responsibility of summarizing written submissions and background reading to
understand the facts and the reasoning of each case. In doing so, the rapporteur
and his référendaire gain the upper hand in first presenting the facts, allowing
them to frame the issues, and provide preliminary suggestions to other judges in
the chamber as to how they should decide the case. The viewpoints of the rap-
porteur can of course be challenged by the other judges on the panel. However,
by being the first to present the facts, it places the rapporteur in a superior bar-
gaining position. This is due to the power of anchoring effects.7
5 See the Criteria for Assigning Cases to Chambers (OJ 2011 C 232), at 3.
6 Art. 13, Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
7 For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have long shown that different starting points for
decision-making yield different results, which are biased against the initial values.
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Another factor that contributes to the enhanced role of the rapporteur is the
workload pressures. Workload crisis is a perennial concern for the General
Court. Indeed, the General Court is currently undergoing a dramatic expansion
reform to cope with increasing caseload. We focus on the pre-reform period, as
the cases that we examined were decided by the General Court before the
expansion. As the rapporteur is the key person involved in a case, they are most
susceptible to the associated workload pressure. This diverts the attention from
cases in which they serve as an assessor, as their responsibilities are less defined
and their involvement may be more flexible in these cases. Although each asses-
sor has the right to contribute their own opinions and observations, they also
have significant discretion in determining the amount and the significance of
such contribution. If an assessor feels strongly about a case, they may be more
interested in intervening. The assessor may disagree with the opinions of the
rapporteur and provide substantive comments to the preliminary report. But
such dissents also come at a cost, as the assessor will need to put more time and
effort in coming up with a different line of reasoning or solution to the case.
Such efforts are also largely unobservable to other judges outside of the given
chamber in the case. Therefore, the busier that the assessors are, the less likely it
is that they will deviate from the proposal of the rapporteur. Moreover, if a case
involves an area of EU law that the assessors and their référendaires are unfamil-
iar with, they will be less likely to provide substantive feedback in disagreement
with the rapporteur. Furthermore, because the rapporteur and their référendaires
have invested more time and effort in the case than other judges, they are likely
to hold a significant information advantage. This further enhances the rappor-
teur’s bargaining position, and increases the likelihood that other judges will
accept their proposal.
Collegiality is another important concern. Judges do not like to be criti-
cized (Posner, 2008) and dissents thus tend to fray collegiality among judges.
Epstein et al. (2011) predict that the more often that judges sit together, the
more likely it is that they will invest in collegiality and be less likely to dissent.
The vast majority of cases at the General Court are handled by a small cham-
ber consisting of three judges. Therefore, judges who regularly sit together
will be likely to invest in collegiality because it is a repeated game among
them. Moreover, because consensus-building is highly valued in order for the
chamber to produce a single coherent judgment, judges who dissent may
experience pronounced pressure to conform. This emphasis on group cohe-
siveness and collegiality, therefore, puts pressure on assessors not to deviate
far from the initial “offer” that the rapporteur suggested.
IV. EMPIRICAL TEST OF COMPETITION JUDGMENTS
Based on the analysis developed in Sections II and III, we propose two
hypotheses to be empirically investigated:
First, the legal origin of EU judges will influence their attitudes toward
administrative appeals. Judges from countries that are more heavily influenced
12 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jcle/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/joclec/nhx031/4919548
by guest
on 05 March 2018
by the French tradition in administrative law (that is countries with French legal
tradition, German legal tradition, or ex-socialist legal traditions) are more likely
to be deferential to, and, therefore, rule in favor of, the Commission than those
from the rest of EU countries.
Second, the rapporteur exerts a greater influence on the case outcome
than the other judges in the same chamber due to the first mover advantage,
as well as workload, collegiality, and backlog concerns.
A. The Approach
We test the above hypotheses by examining whether there is a statistically sig-
nificant effect between a judge’s legal origin and the case outcome. We use
the judge’s country of origin as a proxy for the legal tradition in which he was
bred. Admittedly, this is not a perfect proxy. On some occasions, a judge
from a French legal tradition country may have studied in a common law
country and vice versa. However, these occasions are rare. Only two EU
judges from Continental Europe have received legal training in common law
countries in our dataset. Moreover, these two judges obtained extensive legal
training in Continental Europe before obtaining a master’s degree in the
common law jurisdiction. Similarly, only one common law judge has
received a French legal education. We tackled this problem by treating him
as if he were a judge from France. In any event, our result does not change
qualitatively whether we treat him as a common law judge or a French judge.
Furthermore, because of the nature of the collective decision-making pro-
cess, we also take into account the influence of other judges in the chamber.
We control this factor by including the ratio of the legal origin of all the
judges from the chamber in the regression equation.
Certainly, legal tradition is not the whole story. Each individual’s precon-
ceptions are a complicated mixture of experiences and background, so it is
difficult to reach a credible conclusion by simply relying on a single aspect.
For instance, a judge who was a civil servant before joining the bench may
have a different approach in handling administrative cases compared with a
judge who was in private practice. Therefore, we control for a judge’s prior
work experience. Similarly, as the CJEU’s working language is French and
many of its rules and procedures are obviously derivative of French adminis-
trative law, one might hypothesize that a judge’s familiarity with the French
language and French procedures could also influence his attitude toward
administrative appeals. We control for this by examining whether a judge has
received legal training in a French-speaking countries (Belgium, France, and
Luxembourg). We also include other possible control variables that one may
expect to use in regression analysis, such as sex and age.
Because cases are assigned automatically to a chamber (with the exception
of the President’s intervention in balancing caseload), we can treat case
assignments as random allocation to the chambers. After a case has been
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assigned to a chamber, the chamber president determines the rapporteur. As
there is no statutory requirement or procedure that the chamber president
must follow in choosing a rapporteur, the chamber president retains a certain
amount of discretion. Thus, we also control the legal origin of the chamber
president and consider their interaction with the rapporteur.
The outcome of each case is our dependent variable, which indicates whether
a decision favors private businesses or the Commission.8 We also control for
other variables that could potentially influence the case outcome. For example,
private businesses may be more likely to win in certain categories of competition
cases than others. Moreover, because a member state’s intervention in a compe-
tition case could exert political pressures on the court, we control for this by
looking at whether a member state has intervened as a party.
In 2004, ten countries joined the EU and the number of member states
expanded from 15 to 25 overnight. Eight of these countries are ex-socialist
countries with legal traditions influenced by French administrative law.
Because of this dramatic change in the court’s composition, one might
hypothesize that, after 2004, the General Court is more likely to reach an
outcome in favor of the Commission. We control for this possibility by exam-
ining whether such decisions were reached after 2004. We also control for
other major events that took place during the relevant period, including the
enactment of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the accession of Nordic coun-
tries in 1995, and the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.
Last but not least, we use the length of the opinion and the duration of the
proceeding as proxies for the complexities of a case. This is potentially valu-
able if one believes that case complexity may influence judicial outcome.
B. Ideology
Abundant literature has shown that judicial behavior could be influenced by pol-
itical ideology (Epstein et al., 2013). We do not have data on the political ideol-
ogy of the individual judges. However, because each member state selects their
own judges to the CJEU, we use the political ideology of the appointing govern-
ments as a proxy for their ideology. This assumes that appointing governments
choose judges whose ideologies are aligned with or close to their own prefer-
ences. We acknowledge that this is not a perfect proxy, as each member state
needs to take into account a number of factors in appointing judges. For
instance, because the court’s working language is French, some member states
may have difficulty in finding suitable candidates with fluency in French
8 We acknowledge that using the partial or total annulment of a Commission decision as a proxy
for judicial deference is not perfect. It is possible that in some cases, the partial annulment of a
decision on minor procedural points may leave law and policy wholly unaffected. The
Commission is a repeat player who is not necessarily interested in the outcome of every single
case, but in shaping the law more broadly. However, it is unlikely that a systematic annulment
would be welcomed by the Commission, and alternative coding demands a disturbing degree
of subjectivity.
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(Zhang, 2016). Nonetheless, political ideology seems to play an important role
in judicial appointment, as evidenced by previous qualitative studies on the
court (Alter, 1998; Kenney, 2002; Costa, 2003).
There are many different ways to measure the ideological orientation of the
appointing governments. One common indicator is the left–right politics (Hix
et al., 2007; Voeten, 2007). For instance, one may expect that judges appointed
by the right-wing governments are more inclined to rule in favor of private busi-
nesses than judges appointed by the left-wing governments. Another relevant
indicator is the appointing government’s stance on European integration. It is
possible that judges who are appointed by governments are more in favor of
European integration and will be less likely to overrule a Commission decision,
as this will undermine the Commission’s authority. Therefore, we also control
the right–left politics and the pro-EU preference of the appointing governments
in our regression. These controls are of particular importance as Nordic countries
and the United Kingdom, for example, are known to be less pro-EU enthusiasts
than other jurisdictions.
C. Description of the Data
To test the above hypotheses, we hand-collected and created two original
datasets.
Drawing from the CJEU’s case law database, we created a new original
dataset that contains case characteristics, panel composition, and decision
outcomes of competition cases decided by the General Court from its incep-
tion in 1989 to September 1, 2015. This dataset consists of all judgments
reached as a consequence of the private parties’ applications to annul the
competition decisions (not including state-aid cases) by the Commission.
We focus exclusively on judgments, though not all actions for annulments
result in judgments. Many applications were either dismissed by the General
Court on grounds of admissibility or were withdrawn later by the private par-
ties themselves. In such circumstances, the court only issues an order, rather
than a judgment. As there is usually no substantive issue involved in orders,
we expect that legal origin is unlikely to play a large role in these cases. For
this reason, the dataset includes only judgments and exclude orders issued
by the court. We note, however, that there is a potential problem of the selec-
tion effect. Suppose some private parties withdrew their cases after they knew
the composition of the chamber and predicted an adverse outcome based on
the legal origins of the judges (for example, a chamber dominated by judges
from countries heavily influenced by the French legal tradition).9 As our
9 If private parties withdrew their cases after they knew the composition of the panel was more
heavily influenced by common law judges, we would derive the opposite implication.
However, this reasoning would require a different theory because common law judges are
expected to be less deferential to the Commission.
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dataset does not include those cases that were ultimately withdrawn, our
regression results may underestimate the legal origin bias.
The outcome of each judgment is a dummy variable of “0” or “1.” If an
application is dismissed by the General Court, it is coded as “0.” If the
Commission’s decision is partially annulled or completely annulled, it is coded
as “1.” Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the legal origins of rapporteurs
and the annulment rate of the competition judgments in our dataset.
In addition to case outcome, other variables that we coded include (1)
case type (cartel and fines, vertical agreement, mergers, dominance, and pro-
cedural cases); (2) the chamber composition (the identity of the rapporteur,
chamber president, and other judges); (3) length of opinion (word count of
the French version of the judgment); (4) duration of proceeding (the interval
between the date that the private parties lodged their appeal and the date that
the judgment is announced); (5) whether a case was decided after 2004; and
(6) whether a member state intervened in the case.
We rely on several sources to collect the background characteristics of EU
judges. Most of the information was either collected from the CJEU’s annual
reports or from its official websites. They generally show the educational
backgrounds and work experiences of the judges prior to joining the court.
However, some of these profiles are incomplete. Some contain missing infor-
mation about the educational backgrounds of the judges, rendering it impos-
sible to verify where they graduated from or what degree they received. Some
profiles contain significant gaps in a judge’s working history. The other source
of information comes from the European Council. Whenever an EU judge is
nominated by the member states, the European Council publishes his resume.
Some of these resumes can be found in the archives, but others are missing;
we thus made a formal information request to the European Council for the
missing resumes.
Based on the above sources of information, we were able to create a data-
set of the background characteristics of the judges who have served at the
General Court (except for the education information for three judges, see
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Legal Origins of Rapporteurs and Annulment Rate (N = 559).
Legal
Tradition
Number
of Judges
Number
of Cases*
Annulment
Rate** (%)
Common 10 62 53
Nordic 7 118 64
German 5 46 35
French 26 234 38
Ex-socialist 17 99 36
Total 65 559 45
*Number of cases: number of cases in which the group of judges served as rapporteur.
**Annulment rate: the percentage that the General Court annuls or partially annuls the
Commission’s decisions in cases decided by rapporteurs from a particular legal origin.
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Appendix A). The main characteristics we coded include (1) country of ori-
gin; (2) primary prior work experience; (3) last job before joining the Court;
(4) whether the judge received legal training in France, Luxembourg, or
Belgium; (5) age; and (6) gender. In particular, we classified judges’ prior
job experience into four categories: academic, civil servant, private practi-
tioner, and judge. As many judges have varied work experience prior to join-
ing the Court, “primary prior work experience” reflects the position that a
judge has held the longest among all his prior work experience.
In proxy for the ideology of each EU judges who served at the Court, we
measure the ideology of his appointment government. This is done by multi-
plying the ideology score for each party represented in a state cabinet or
council of ministers by its weight in the cabinet, then taking the sum of the
new weighted values to obtain the average ideology score. We obtain two dif-
ferent ideology scores for each party from the Manifesto Project database
(Volkens et al., 2016). One is on the left–right position of the party and the
other is on EU integration, which measures positive mentions of the EU in
the party manifesto (Volkens et al., 2014).
D. First Results
We perform several analyses to test the two hypotheses stated at the beginning
of this section. To test our first hypothesis, we classify the judges into two groups
according to their legal origins. One group consists of judges from French,
German, and ex-socialist legal traditions, labeled as “strong French influence”
(denoted “1”); the other group consists of judges from common law and Nordic
countries, labeled as “weak French influence” (“0”).
The first analysis explores the overall relationship between the case out-
come and the ratio of “strong French influence” judges for each case. In par-
ticular, we consider a logistic regression model of the outcome on the ratio of
strong French influence judges in the chamber. The estimated effect of the
ratio is −0.99 with a standard deviation 0.36 and p-value less than 0.01.
Thus, for a given case, the winning odds of the Commission in a chamber
with 100% judges from strong French influence countries is higher than the
odds in a chamber with judges from weak French influence countries by a
factor of 2.7. Together with the random case allocation to each chamber, we
are able to reach a conclusion that chambers with more strong French influ-
ence judges are more likely to rule in favor of the Commission.
We further investigate the impact of the rapporteur and consider a logistic
regression model of the outcome on the legal origin of the rapporteur by using
Nordic judges as the benchmark.10 As shown in specification 1 in Table 3, judges
from strong French influence countries are significantly different from the bench-
mark (Nordic). Meanwhile, judges from French, German, and ex-socialist
10 Notably, our statistical results are not influenced by the choice of benchmark.
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origins seem remarkably similar. In addition, the difference between the common
law and Nordic law countries is insignificant as well. This result is consistent with
our prediction that the voting preferences of Nordic judges are closer to those of
common law judges than those of judges from the rest of the Continental
Europe. This provides further support to our legal origin hypothesis.
For robustness check, we also test the statistical relationship between legal
origin and case outcome using different methods of classifications as dis-
cussed in Section II above. As shown in specifications 2 and 3 below, the
results are consistent with those in specification 1. In particular, Specification
2 uses all subgroups as identified in Table 1. Specification 3 lumps together
all jurisdictions influenced by German law.
E. Regression Analysis
We then consider the impact of the rapporteur and the chamber president.
The assignment of the rapporteur for each case is decided by the chamber
president, which is not a randomized process. Moreover, the assignment
preference of each chamber president is not observable. When assessing the
impact of the rapporteur, we need to consider potentially confounding phe-
nomena. The consideration of the workload and the expertise of the assign-
ees may affect the chamber president’s assignment, but these factors are
independent of the eventual case outcome. On the other hand, the chamber
president may have his own preference in choosing the rapporteur that could
potentially lead to an assignment bias toward private businesses. In the ideal
case, for each chamber president, we might prefer to assess the effect of the
rapporteur on the cases handled by the particular chamber president.
However, this is practically infeasible due to the limited dataset size.
In the following analysis, we use the chamber president’s legal origin as
the main proxy for his preference in selecting the rapporteur to each case. As
Table 3. Case Outcome on Rapporteur’s Legal Origin (N = 559)
1 2 3
Intercept 0.56** (0.19) 0.56** (0.19) 0.56** (0.19)
Common −0.43 (0.32) −0.43 (0.32) −0.43 (0.32)
German −1.18** (0.36) −1.18** (0.36) …
German French … −1.13*** (0.26) …
Pure French … −0.84** (0.29) −0.84** (0.29)
German Ex-Socialist … −1.10** (0.39) …
Other Ex-Socialist … −1.13*** (0.32) −1.13*** (0.32)
Total German … … −1.14*** (0.24)
French −1.02*** (0.23) … …
Ex-Socialist −1.12*** (0.28) … …
Note: Robust Z-statistics are in parentheses.
Total German includes German, German French, and German Ex-Socialist legal origins.
*Significant at 5%; **significant at 1%, ***significant at 0.1%.
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the current interest is in the impact of legal tradition on judicial attitude and
not in other possible biases, this choice is a reasonable compromise given the
limited information that we have in the dataset. Our analysis allows the
effects of the rapporteur to be different for strong French influence and weak
French influence chamber presidents. The difference between these two
effects reflects the assignment preference of these two types of chamber presi-
dents. More precisely, we consider a regression model with the legal origins
of both the rapporteur and the chamber president, as well as the interaction
term (between these two variables). This interaction term captures the pos-
sible difference in the assignment preference of these two types of chamber
presidents (strong and weak French influence). We also include the ratio of
strong French influence judges in the chamber.
For robustness check, we consider two possible definitions of strong
French influence judges in Table 4. One definition consists of all the judges
from the French legal origin countries (defined as strong French (1)) and the
other consists of all the judges from the French, German, and ex-socialist
legal tradition countries (defined as strong French (2).
In the above regression table, the legal origin of the rapporteur has a highly
significant negative effect on the case outcome. Such a result is consistent
among all the specifications (including different definitions of strong French
influence judges). The legal origin of the chamber president also has a statis-
tically significant negative effect (however, such effect is more significant
under the broader definition of strong French). This is a remarkably import-
ant piece of evidence supporting our first hypothesis that legal traditions
influence judicial attitude in handling competition appeals. At the same time,
in Table 4, the ratio of the strong French influence judges in the chamber is
not significant. This suggests that holding constant the legal origin of the rap-
porteur and of the president of the chamber, the overall ratio of strong
French influence judges in a chamber do not have a significant effect. This
offers strong evidence in support of our second hypothesis, in that the rap-
porteur has greater influence on the case outcome than other judges in the
chamber. We can anticipate that this result will get more support once add-
itional variables are included in Table 5 and the effect of the legal origin of
the chamber president disappears.
In addition, the interaction between the rapporteur and the chamber presi-
dent is positively significant (or barely significant) in some specifications.
This is an indication that the assignment of the rapporteur can be influenced
by bias. In any event, more data need to be collected to further strengthen
this evidence. Notably, our results are robust to how we define the scope of
strong French influence countries, whether we only include those that are
French legal origin countries, or all the countries that have been heavily influ-
enced by French origin (including the French, German, and ex-socialist
countries). Moreover, we find that the rapporteur’s left–right ideology and
his pro-EU ideology are not statistically significant.
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Results of Case Outcome on Legal Origins and Other Covariates (N = 545)11
1 2 3 4
(Intercept) −0.113 (−0.593) 0.777* (2.258) −0.164 (−0.703) 0.670 (1.656)
Rapporteur Strong French (1) −0.710** (−2.610) −0.796** (−2.752)
Rapporteur Strong French (2) −1.466*** (−3.989) −1.664*** (−4.295)
Chair Strong French (1) −0.594* (−2.202) −0.596* (−2.180)
Chair Strong French (2) −1.026** (−3.230) −0.941** (−2.790)
Rapporteur Strong French (1) × Chair Strong French (1) 0.570 (1.4887) 0.690 (0.080)
Rapporteur Strong French (2) × Chair Strong French (2) 0.972* (2.093) 1.064* (2.204)
Ratio Strong French (1) 0.676 (1.466) 0.521 (1.085)
Ratio Strong French (2) 0.271 (0.510) 0.240 (0.436)
Left Right 0.001 (0.240) 0.000 (0.003)
Pro-EU 0.044 (0.924) 0.055 (1.124)
Note: Robust Z-statistics are in parentheses
Significant at 5%; **significant at 1%, ***significant at 0.1%
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Table 5. Logistic Regression Results of Case Outcome on Legal Origins and Other Covariates (N = 545)
1 2 3 4 5 6
(Intercept) −9.031*** (−4.289) −8.241*** (−3.915) −6.717*** (−3.291) −8.934*** (−4.082) −6.132** (−3.000) −8.779*** (−4.004)
Rapporteur Strong
French (1)
−1.194** (−3.186) −1.032** (−2.696) −1.424*** (−3.528)
Rapporteur Strong
French (2)
−1.704*** (−3.784) −1.794*** (−3.888) −1.996*** (−4.143)
Chair Strong French (1) −0.385 (−1.221) −0.346 (−1.105) −0.309 (−0.944)
Chair Strong French (2) −0.867* (−2.307) −0.731 (−1.876) −0.632 (−1.574)
Rapporteur Strong French
(1) × Chair Strong French
(1)
0.889 (1.923) 0.594 (1.274) 0.989* (2.020)
Rapporteur Strong French
(2) × Chair Strong French
(2)
1.011 (1.876) 0.848 (1.532) 0.970 (1.690)
Ratio Strong French (1) −0.047 (−0.076) −0.027 (−0.045) −0.625 (−0.955)
Ratio Strong French (2) 0.483 (0.793) 0.313 (0.497) 0.460 (0.706)
Left Right 0.012 (1.667) 0.007 (0.939) 0.013 (1.684) 0.013 (1.663)
Pro-EU 0.128* (1.973) 0.182* (2.524) 0.161* (2.433) 0.223** (3.001)
Government 0.475 (1.211) 0.105 (0.263) 0.669 (1.586) 0.149 (0.331) 0.020 (0.046) −0.370 (−0.796)
Practitioner 1.160 (1.890) 0.447 (0.670) 2.380** (2.661) 2.535* (2.562) 1.197 (1.290) 1.332 (1.275)
Judge −0.096 (−0.247) −0.486 (−1.294) 0.034 (0.086) −0.094 (−0.229) −0.471 (−1.213) −0.637 (−1.581)
Last-Government −0.578 (−1.273) −0.316 (−0.704) −0.788 (−1.686) −0.742 (−1.540) −0.375 (−0.805) −0.391 (−0.822)
Last-Practitioner −1.749** (−2.685) −1.517* (−2.223) −2.859** (−3.000) −3.133** (−3.003) −2.272* (−2.306) −2.580* (−2.363)
Last-Judge 0.132 (0.305) 0.162 (0.380) 0.011 (0.023) 0.126 (0.270) 0.239 (0.524) 0.233 (0.506)
French Education 0.076 (0.242) 0.132 (0.481) 0.245 (0.767) 0.224 (0.684) 0.303 (1.120) 0.289 (1.017)
French Education-NA 0.839 (1.267) 0.942 (1.469) 1.100 (1.718) 0.873 (1.283) 1.094 (1.775) 0.982 (1.497)
Age 0.017 (0.934) 0.024 (1.307) 0.009 (0.434) 0.001 (0.057) 0.017 (0.848) 0.012 (0.563)
Gender 1.097*** (3.326) 0.767* (2.386) 1.158*** (3.340) 1.188*** (3.307) 0.875* (2.521) 0.935** (2.610)
Avg Gender −0.580 (−1.021) −0.587 (−1.043) −0.327 (−0.592) −0.403 (−0.686) −0.523 (−0.967) −0.485 (−0.828)
Avg Age 0.020 (0.892) 0.014 (0.602) 0.012 (0.555) 0.017 (0.718) 0.0124 (0.569) 0.011 (0.468)
Continued
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Table 5. Continued
1 2 3 4 5 6
Vertical −0.595 (−1.242) −0.394 (−0.808) −0.125 (−0.262) −0.466 (−0.938) −0.041 (−0.087) −0.251 (−0.498)
Dominance −1.257*** (−3.760) −1.132*** (−3.432) −1.053** (−3.212) −1.332*** (−3.829) −1.008** (−3.111) −1.189*** (−3.477)
Concentration −1.854*** (−4.130) −1.620*** (−3.167) −1.342** (−3.134) −1.689*** (−3.733) −1.255** (−2.869) −1.469** (−3.214)
Procedural −1.127** (−2.757) −0.891* (−2.192) −1.279 (−3.131)** −1.141** (−2.653) −1.110** (−2.732) 0.904* (−2.129)
State Int. 0.179 (0.439) 0.174 (0.427) 0.272 (0.667) 0.279 (0.672) 0.225 (0.551) 0.247 (0.600)
Length 0.651*** (3.977) 0.650*** (3.965) 0.519*** (3.314) 0.668*** (4.004) 0.520** (3.274) 0.670*** (3.980)
Duration −0.141 (−1.097) −0.140 (−1.117) −0.018 (−0.142) −0.087 (−0.649) −0.033 (−0.268) −0.051 (−0.392)
Year Fixed 1 1.826** (3.048) 1.721** (2.905) 2.357*** (3.616) 2.234*** (3.509)
Year Fixed 2 1.609** (3.005) 1.402** (2.610) 2.035*** (3.450) 1.815** (3.084)
Year Fixed 3 0.503 (0.861) 0.500 (0.879) 0.953 (1.497) 0.938 (1.488)
Year Fixed 4 0.472 (0.829) 0.599 (1.117) 1.067 (1.691) 1.334* (2.172)
Note: Robust Z-statistics are in parentheses.
*Significant at 5%; **significant at 1%, ***significant at 0.1%.
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In Table 5, we also include covariates such as background variables of the
judges (work experience, French legal education, age, gender) and the cases
(case type, state intervention or not, length of opinion, duration of proceed-
ing) that have significant or potentially significant effects on the outcome.
We also control the year fixed effects (1993, 1995, 2004, 2009) in specifica-
tions 1, 2, 4 and 6 as discussed in Section IV.A above.
In the above table, we find that the legal origin of the rapporteur still has a
highly significant effect on the case outcome across all specifications.
However, the legal origin of the chamber president is no longer significant in
most specifications. Nor is the ratio of the strong French influence judges in
the chamber significant. This further supports our second hypothesis that the
rapporteur plays a more important role in influencing the outcome than other
judges in the chamber. Notably, the rapporteur’s pro-EU ideology is posi-
tively significant in a few specifications, which is counterintuitive. We further
look into this issue and found that the correlation between the case outcome
and Pro-EU ideology is practically zero. Furthermore, pro-EU ideology is
significantly correlated with the rapporteur’s prior work experience, and it is
this multicollinearity issue that has led to the odd result. In any event, the
overall effect of pro-EU is very small compared with the effect of legal origin.
We find that the rapporteur’s gender is positively correlated to the case
outcome, male judges are more likely to rule in favor of private businesses
than females. This is an interesting result but we note here that there are only
ten female judges (15%) against 55 male judges (85%). Furthermore, these
10 female judges are distributed across legal families (one common law, two
Nordic, one French, and six ex-socialist countries). This suggests that gender
is not a major driver of the empirical results.
Additionally, private businesses are more likely to win in certain categories
of cases than in others. The likelihood of success (in descending order) are:
cartels, dominance, and concentrations. Furthermore, we find that whether a
member state had or had not intervened in a competition appeal does not
bear significant effect on the outcome. It is possible that this is due to the
limited dataset size, as member states intervened in less than 8% of the cases
in our statistical population.
Holding all of the other independent variables constant (in specification
6), we find that the odds of a ruling in favor of the Commission is increased
by a factor of 7.4 if the rapporteur is from a strong French influence, rather
than a weak French influence country. A simple example will illustrate the
effects. In our dataset, if the rapporteur is from a strong French influence
country, there is a 37% chance that the General Court will annul (or partially
annul) the Commission’s decision, and the odds of annulment is 0.59. If a
weak French influence judge serves as the rapporteur instead, the odds will
be increased to 4.33, which amounts to an 81% chance of annulment (or
partial annulment). In addition, we find that strong French influence judges
served as rapporteurs in 65% of competition judgments decided before or in
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2004, but that the number increased to 70% after 2004. We interpret this
result as evidence supporting the view that judges from strong French influ-
ence countries exert substantially greater influence in competition judgments
than those from the weak French influence countries, and such influence has
increased with the expansion of the EU. We believe that these results shed
light on the profound influence of the French legal tradition in shaping EU
competition law jurisprudence. We go as far as to predict that if British
judges leave the General Court after Brexit, then the French influence will
further intensify.
F. Robustness Check
One potential concern with our results is that the cases at the General Court
are not randomly assigned to the chambers. As discussed earlier, we take the
view that the General Court randomly assigns cases to the chambers, with
the exception that the President of the court can intervene on the basis of
workload. For example, the President will always assign cases that are linked
to the same Commission decision to the same chamber. Typically, in cartel
cases, the Commission often simultaneously penalizes several companies for
their participation in a cartel. When these cartel members appeal to the
General Court, such appeals are treated as separate cases in the court’s dock-
et. However, because these cases are closely linked to each other and involve
similar facts and circumstances, for efficiency purposes, the default rule at
the General Court is to allocate these cases to the same chamber. This is
indeed what we observe in our dataset.
For a robustness check, we combine these linked cases by averaging their out-
comes (not surprisingly, for most cases, their average outcomes are either “0” or
“1” due to consistency across decisions). We then run a logistic regression using
the same variables as our main regression—specification 6 in Table 5 (where the
combined outcome is the dependent variable). Consistent with our results
above, the rapporteur’s legal origin remains significant. Meanwhile, other inde-
pendent variables are not significant. This is probably due to the fact that the
dataset size is reduced to 306 cases. A different regression that dichotomizes the
combined outcome with a cutoff point at 0.5 produces similar results. In add-
ition, we consider a mixed effect logistic model that includes a random effect
term to linked cases. Due to the smaller dataset size, we only use the main inde-
pendent variables such as the legal origins of the rapporteur and the chamber
president, and the rapporteur’s political ideology. The results remain robust,
confirming that the potential cluster effect does not significantly change our con-
clusion (see Table B.3 in the Appendix). We further consider a mixed effect
logistic model that includes a random effect term to both linked cases and the
rapporteur’s legal origin and the results are closely similar.
As an additional robustness check, we conduct a statistical analysis to assess
if different types of cases are evenly distributed across chambers. Again, we
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consider cases linked to each Commission decision as a single observation. The
main case characteristics that we have are the types of anticompetitive conduct
under dispute: cartel, vertical agreement, dominance, concentrations, and pro-
cedural matters. As our main independent variable is legal origin, we consider
the ratio of the strong French influence judges in the chamber as the response
variable and run a one-way analysis of variance, with p-value=17%. This sug-
gests that the types of cases distributed are roughly similar across chambers.
Furthermore, we include random effect terms to account for the cluster effect
due the same Commission decision and the same rapporteur, the effect of the
rapporteur’s legal origin remains significant after this adjustment.
As we find that the chamber president’s assignment of rapporteur could be
driven by bias, we also consider whether the importance of a case would have an
impact on assignment bias. For instance, one may hypothesize that the chamber
president who wish to exert maximum influence will assign less important cases
to a rapporteur from a different legal origin and more important cases to a rap-
porteur from the same (or closely similar) legal origins. Because important cases
are usually assigned to larger chambers consisting of five or more judges, we use
chamber size as a proxy for case importance. Here chamber size is coded as a
dummy variable, if it is larger than 3 it is coded as 1, otherwise it is 0. We then
run a regression with all the variables in Specification 6 in Table 5, plus three
more variables including chamber size, the interaction between chamber size
and the rapporteur’s legal origin, and the interaction between chamber size and
assignment preference (which is the interaction of the legal origin of the cham-
ber president and the rapporteur). Our main results remain robust, but none of
the three variables relating to chamber size is significant, indicating that chamber
size does not seem to have an impact on the chamber president’s assignment
preference. It is possible this is due to the fact that most cases handled by the
General Court are routine cases. Indeed, among the cases in our dataset, almost
three quarters of the cases are heard by a three-judge chamber.
G. Implications
Our study has significant implications. It contributes to the ongoing debate
about the effects of legal origin on economic growth. One potential interpret-
ation is that these results are consistent with the previous law and finance lit-
erature (La Porta et al., 2004). Judges from countries whose administrative
law traditions have a strong French influence are more likely to reach deci-
sions that interfere with private property and personal liberty. At the same
time, our results also identify an effect that has been underexplored in the
current literature, that is, Nordic law shares similar beliefs about the intensive
review of administrative decisions with common law and judges from Nordic
countries are less likely to be deferential to the Commission than judges from
other Continental European countries. In this respect, Nordic law seems clo-
ser to common law than to French law. This is consistent with Siems
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(2016)’s finding showing that Scandinavian countries belong to the same
group as common law countries rather than other European jurisdictions in
his network of world’s legal systems.
A second interpretation, closely related to the first one, is that legal origin
captures the different judicial attitude towards administrative discretion in
different jurisdictions, particularly reflecting possible doctrinal specificities.
Although judges from strong French influence countries are reticent in inter-
vening in administrative discretion, judges from common law and Nordic
countries do not hesitate to conduct intensive scrutiny of administrative deci-
sion. Such an outcome is consistent with the anecdotal evidence one of us
obtained during her field trip in Luxembourg, as well as the extrajudicial
writings from some of the leading figures from the General Court (Zhang,
2016). As our dataset is limited to competition judgments, we do not know
whether this is a phenomenon unique to the area of competition law, which
often requires complex economic and technical analysis.
A third interpretation is that legal origins capture a potentially omitted
dimension (closely correlated with legal families). Because our empirical analysis
controls for ideology (domestic and European skepticism), such possible inter-
pretation is excluded. Another possibly relevant factor is the appointment of
judges in general (a selection effect). The premise would be that civil law judges
tend to be closer to governmental institutions and even European institutions,
such as the European Council or the Council of Ministers. As a result, they may
well be more inclined to defer to the executive. On the other hand, Nordic and
common law countries tend to appoint judges with private practice experience
and they may be less likely to defer to the executive. Notwithstanding this
hypothesis, our empirical analysis does control for judicial background (Table 5)
and finds that judges who were in private practice immediately before joining
the General Court tend to favor the Commission. Therefore, this alternative
interpretation is statistically rejected by our results.
Future empirical studies will be needed to confirm whether our results
extend beyond competition law. Table B.4 in the Appendix provides the
ranking and score of different indicators for business attitudes according to
the classification of legal origins we use in Table 1. For instance, Nordic and
common law countries are on average more business friendly than other EU
countries. Thus, it seems difficult to empirically distinguish the effects of the
legal origins in the sense of the law and finance literature and those in the
sense of possible doctrinal specificities reflecting a different understanding of
competition. This complicates any possible empirical analysis limited to com-
petition litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
EU competition law is often used as a yardstick for many other countries and
its precedents have been widely followed by competition authorities around
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the world. At the same time, there is considerable dissatisfaction with the
judicial output from Luxembourg, which often appears very formalistic and
deferential to the Commission, in sharp contrast with its US counterparts.
Legal scholars have long explained the divergence between US antitrust law
and EU competition law by resorting to the historical origin and philosoph-
ical underpinning of EU competition law. This article breaks new ground by
proposing that the legal tradition has also exerted enormous influence on
shaping EU competition law.
Our empirical results offer strong support for this view. Using hand-
collected data on EU judges’ background characteristics and on the com-
petition law judgments reached by the General Court, we find a statistically
significant effect between judges’ legal origins and case outcomes. We also iden-
tify evidence suggesting that the rapporteur plays a greater role than other
judges in influencing the outcome of competition cases. Specifically, if a rap-
porteur is from a country where its administrative law has a strong French
influence, the court is more likely to rule in favor of the Commission than if
the rapporteur is from any other EU country. Our results also show that
judges from strong French influence countries have exerted substantially great-
er input in producing EU competition law jurisprudence than those from weak
French influence countries, and such influence has become even greater since
the EU’s expansion in 2004.
This article further sheds light on the path dependence in the judicial law
making of antitrust law. Judges who “make” law inherently face a set of institu-
tional constraints. These humanly devised constraints include not only formal
rules which can be subject to radical changes, but also informal constraints,
such as customs and traditions which tend to be sticky. These institutional con-
straints shape the incentive structures of judges, nourish their ideologies and
beliefs, and have a direct impact on their behavior. As institutional change is
path-dependent, evolution within a legal system is only gradual. This article,
therefore, provides a basis for predicting that the divergence between US anti-
trust law and EU competition law will persist in the future.
As a product of unique historical circumstances, the CJEU continues to oper-
ate under profound French influence. The findings in this article are consistent
with the law and finance literature showing that French legal origin countries
tend to provide less secure property rights protection to investors. They are also
consistent with possible variations on doctrinal idiosyncrasies. This raises con-
cern about the profound influence of French legal tradition on the court. This is
a deeply important question, which we leave for future study.
APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES
Our dataset for judges consists of the background characteristics of 65 EU
judges who served at the General Court between its inception in 1989 and
September 1, 2015. As we lack complete education information for three
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judges, it is not possible to verify whether those judges received their legal
education in a French-speaking country. In addition, Savvas Papasavvas, a
judge from Cyprus, did not study law in his home country but received exten-
sive legal training in Greece and France. For this reason, we treat him as if he
were a judge from a French legal tradition country. In any event, our results
do not qualitatively change whether we viewed him as a common law or a
French origin judge.
Our dataset for cases consists of all competition cases for which there was
a judgment reached by the General Court from 1989 through September 1,
2015. In total, here are 573 cases in our dataset, but 14 of those cases contain
missing data. In the analysis, we drop the incomplete cases, only considering
the remaining 559 cases that were fully observed. When running the regres-
sion in Table 4, we drop an additional 14 cases, as we lack data on the polit-
ical ideology of the appointing governments of three judges in the dataset.
Table A.1. Variable Coding and Sources
Variable Coding and Sources
Outcome Equal to 1 if the General Court annuls or partially annuls the
Commission’s decision; equal to 0 otherwise
Common Equal to 1 if the rapporteur came from a common law country in the EU
(the UK, Ireland, Cyprus, or Malta); equal to 0 otherwise
Nordic Equal to 1 if the rapporteur came from a Nordic legal tradition country
(Denmark, Finland, or Sweden); equal to 0 otherwise. This variable is
used as the benchmark in the regression analysis
German Equal to 1 if the rapporteur came from a German legal tradition country
(Austria or Germany); equal to 0 otherwise
French Equal to 1 if the rapporteur came from a French legal tradition country
(Belgium, Luxembourg, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece,
Portugal, or Spain); equal to 0 otherwise
Ex-Socialist Equal to 1 if the rapporteur came from an ex-socialist legal tradition
country in the EU (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, or Slovenia); equal to 0
otherwise
Pure French Equal to 1 if the rapporteur came from a French-speaking French legal
tradition country (Belgium, Luxembourg, or France); equal to 0
otherwise
German French Equal to 1 if the rapporteur came from a nonFrench-speaking French
legal tradition country (the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Portugal, or
Spain); equal to 0 otherwise
German Ex-Socialist Equal to 1 if the rapporteur came from an ex-socialist country that were
influenced by German law as parts of the Austria–Hungarian Empire
(Czech, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, or Croatia); equal to 0 otherwise
Other Ex-Socialist Equal to 1 if the rapporteur came from an ex-socialist legal tradition
country in the EU that were not part of the Austria–Hungarian
Empire (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, or Romania);
equal to 0 otherwise
Total German Equal to 1 if the rapporteur came from a German French, German ex-
socialist, or German legal tradition country; equal to 0 otherwise
Continued
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Table A.1. Continued
Variable Coding and Sources
Rapporteur Strong
French (1)
Equal to 1 if the rapporteur came from a French legal tradition
countries; equal to 0 otherwise
Rapporteur Strong
French (2)
Equal to 1 if the rapporteur came from a French legal tradition, German
legal tradition or ex-socialist legal tradition countries; equal to 0
otherwise
Chair Strong French (1) Equal to 1 if the chamber president came a French legal tradition
countries; equal to 0 otherwise
Chair Strong French (2) Equal to 1 if the chamber president came from a French legal tradition,
German legal tradition, or ex-socialist legal tradition countries; equal
to 0 otherwise
Ratio Strong French (1) The ratio of judges from a French legal tradition country in a chamber
Ratio Strong French (2) The ratio of judges from a French, German, or ex-socialist legal tradition
country in a chamber
Left Right The left–right ideology score of the appointing government of the
rapporteur. The score is calculated by multiplying the left–right score
for each party represented in a state cabinet or council of ministers by
its weight in the cabinet, then taking the sum of the new weighted
values to obtain the average ideology score. Each party’s score is
obtained from the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2014)
Pro-EU The pro-EU ideology score of the appointing government of the
rapporteur. The score is calculated by multiplying the pro-EU score
for each party represented in a state cabinet or council of ministers by
its weight in the cabinet, then taking the sum of the new weighted
values to obtain the average ideology score. Each party’s score is
obtained from the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2014)
Academic Equal to 1 if the rapporteur’s primary prior working experience is as an
academic. This variable is used as the benchmark in the regression
analysis
Government Equal to 2 if the rapporteur’s primary prior working experience is as a
civil servant
Practitioner Equal to 3 if the rapporteur’s primary prior working experience is as a
private practitioner
Judge Equal to 4 if the rapporteur’s primary prior working experience is as a
judge
Last- Academic Equal to 1 if the rapporteur’s last job prior to joining the General Court
is as an academic. This variable is used as the benchmark in the
regression analysis
Last-Government Equal to 2 if the rapporteur’s last job prior to joining the General Court
is as a civil servant
Last-Practitioner Equal to 3 if the rapporteur’s last job prior to joining the General Court
is as a private practitioner
Last-Judge Equal to 4 if the rapporteur’s last job prior to joining the General Court
is as a judge
French Education Equal to 1 if the judge received his undergraduate or graduate education
in Luxembourg, France or Belgium; equal to 0 otherwise
French Education-NA Equal to 2 if the information regarding the judge’s French legal training
is unavailable
Age The age of the rapporteur when deciding the case
Gender Equal to 1 if the rapporteur is male; equal to 0 otherwise
Avg Gender The percentage of male judges in a chamber
Continued
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Table A.1. Continued
Variable Coding and Sources
Avg Age The average age of the judges in a chamber when deciding a case
Cartel The case involves cartel issues. This variable is used as the benchmark in
the regression analysis
Vertical The case involves vertical agreement issues
Dominance The case involves abuse of dominance issues
Concentration The case involves concentration issues
Procedural The case involves procedural issues
State Int. Equal to 1 if a member state intervened in the case; equal to 0 otherwise
Length The log of the word count of the judgment in French
Duration The period between the date the private parties filed their application to
annul a Commission’s decision and the date of the judgment
Year Fixed 0 Equal to 0 if the judgment was reached between 1989 and 1993. This
variable is used as the benchmark in the regression analysis
Year Fixed 1 Equal to 1 if the judgment was reached between 1994 and 1995
Year Fixed 2 Equal to 2 if the judgment was reached between 1996 and 2004
Year Fixed 3 Equal to 3 if the judgment was reached between 2005and 2009
Year Fixed 4 Equal to 4 if the judgment was reached between 2010 and 2015
APPENDIX B
Table B.1. Summary Statistics for Variable Used in Table 3
Variable Case (1) Case (0) Mean Std. Dev.
Outcome 250 309 0.45 0.50
Common 62 0.11 0.31
Nordic 118 0.21 0.41
German 46 0.08 0.27
French 234 0.42 0.49
Ex-Socialist 99 0.18 0.38
Pure French 86 0.15 0.13
German French 148 0.26 0.19
German Ex-Socialist 38 0.07 0.06
Other Ex-Socialist 61 0.11 0.10
Total German 232 0.42 0.24
Table B.2. Summary Statistics for Variable Used in Table 4
Variable Case (1) Case (0) Mean Std. Dev.
Outcome 244 301 0.45 0.50
Rapporteur Strong French(1) 232 313 0.43 0.49
Rapporteur Strong French(2) 377 168 0.69 0.46
Chair Strong French (1) 241 304 0.44 0.50
Chair Strong French (2) 405 140 0.74 0.44
Ratio Strong French (1) 0.44 0.22
Ratio Strong French (2) 0.73 0.23
Left Right −1.2 14.7
Pro-EU 2.8 1.8
Academic 140 0.56 0.44
Continued
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Table B.2. Continued
Variable Case (1) Case (0) Mean Std. Dev.
Government 183 0.34 0.47
Practitioner 63 0.12 0.32
Judge 159 0.29 0.45
Last- Academic 79 0.14 0.35
Last-Government 193 0.35 0.48
Last-Practitioner 67 0.12 0.33
Last-Judge 206 0.38 0.48
French Education 176 352 0.32 0.47
French Education-NA 17 0.03 0.17
Age 55 6.3
Gender 442 103 0.81 0.39
Avg Gender 0.77 0.25
Avg Age 54 6.2
Cartel 356 0.65 0.48
Vertical 26 0.05 0.21
Dominance 67 0.12 0.33
Concentration 39 0.07 0.26
Procedural 57 0.10 0.31
State Int. 41 504 0.08 0.26
Length 9.7 0.71
Duration 6.5 3.4
Year Fixed 0 34 0.06 0.24
Year Fixed 1 41 0.08 0.26
Year Fixed 2 143 0.26 0.44
Year Fixed 3 78 0.14 0.35
Year Fixed 4 249 0.46 0.50
Table B.3. Generalized Mixed-Effects Model of Outcome on Legal Origins and Political
Ideology
Estimate z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 0.592 1.116 0.265
Rapporteur Strong French(2) −1.611** −3.184 0.001
Chair Strong French (2) −0.716 −1.536 0.125
Rapporteur Strong French (2) × Chair Strong French (2) 0.889 1.436 0.151
Ratio Strong French (2) 0.141 0.201 0.840
Left Right 0.004 0.454 0.650
Pro-EU 0.039 0.633 0.527
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Table B.4. Legal Origin and Possible Indicators of Business Attitudes12 (Averages)
Legal Origin Ranking
position, Doing
Business
Score of Quality
of Regulation,
World Bank
Score of Economic
Freedom, Heritage
Foundation
Score of Global
Competitiveness, World
Economic Forum
Score of Economic
Stability, Economist
Intelligence Unit
Number of
Countries
Common Law and Nordic 24.4 93.3 0.79 0.61 0.85 7
German and Ex-Socialist 27.4 79.8 0.73 0.54 0.75 13
French 40.8 82.0 0.73 0.55 0.83 8
Average 30.5 83.8 0.746 0.56 0.80 28
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